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Child Care Subsidies and Child Development
*
 
Child care subsidies are an important part of federal and state efforts to move welfare 
recipients into employment. One of the criticisms of the current subsidy system, however, is 
that it overemphasizes work and does little to encourage parents to purchase high-quality 
child care. Consequently, there are reasons to be concerned about the implications of child 
care subsidies for child development. In this paper, we provide a systematic assessment of 
the impact of subsidy receipt on a wide range of child outcomes. Drawing on rich data from 
the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, we document a negative relationship between child 
care subsidies and child development. In particular, our results suggest that subsidy receipt 
in the year before kindergarten lowers reading and math test scores and increases a variety 
of behavior problems at kindergarten entry. Some of these negative effects persist to the end 
of kindergarten. A tentative explanation for the poorer outcomes is that subsidized children 
are more likely to receive intense exposure to low-quality child care. 
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Child care subsidies are an important policy instrument to facilitate the transition of welfare 
recipients into employment by defraying the expenses associated with child care.  Indeed, several 
studies show that the cost of child care is an important constraint to helping disadvantaged mothers 
find employment (Kimmel, 1998; Anderson & Levine, 2000; Han & Walfdogel, 2001; Blau & 
Robins, 1988; Blau & Tekin, 2007; Tekin, 2005; 2007).  As a result, the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) reorganized the patchwork 
child care subsidy system.  In particular, Congress consolidated several preexisting subsidy programs 
into a single block grant, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF).  Federal and state 
expenditures for child care assistance were increased substantially, and individual states were given 
greater flexibility in program design and administration.  In 2005, states spent approximately $9.4 
billion on child care subsidies and served 1.7 million children in an average month (Child Care 
Bureau, 2005a). 
A sizable body of research examines the impact of child care subsidy receipt on mothers’ 
employment and child care decisions (e.g., Meyers, Heintze, & Wolf, 2002; Tekin, 2005; 2007; Blau 
& Tekin, 2007).  Findings from these studies indicate that subsidies are effective in moving single 
mothers into paid employment and shifting children from informal child care settings into the formal 
market.  However, researchers have neglected the question of whether child care subsidies have 
implications for child development.  The relevance of this issue is clear, given that expenditures and 
the number of children served through the CCDF exceed other early childhood intervention 
programs.
1  Furthermore, research shows that developmental experiences during the first few years 
                                                 
1 In 2005, Head Start served 906,993 children, with expenditures of $6.8 billion.  Early Head Start serves approximately 62,000 children 
each year, with expenditures of $684 million in 2005 (Office of Head Start, 2006).  Finally, state pre-kindergarten programs enrolled 
801,902 in 2005, with expenditures of $2.8 billion (NIEER, 2005).    
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 of a child’s life have lasting effects on cognitive and behavioral well-being (Heckman & Materov, 
2004; Lynch, 2004).   
Since most child care subsidies are used to purchase center-based care—which has been 
found to promote child development in some studies—it is commonly assumed that subsidies should 
also have positive effects on well-being.  However, it is unclear a priori whether subsidies are 
beneficial or detrimental to child outcomes.  There are three primary channels through which child 
care assistance policies can influence child outcomes.  First, mothers must be employed to be eligible 
for a subsidy, and recent evidence suggests that early maternal employment is negatively associated 
with child development (Bernal, 2008; Brooks-Gunn, Han, & Waldfogel, 2002; James-Burdummy, 
2005; Liu, Mroz, & Van der Klaauw, 2003; Ruhm, 2004).  Second, subsidies create strong incentives 
to purchase nonparental child care.  The evidence here is mixed, with some studies finding positive 
effects of child care attendance (Loeb et al., 2004; NICHD, 2003a; 2003b) and others finding 
insignificant or negative effects (Baydar & Brooks-Gunn, 1991; Bernal & Keane, 2008; Blau, 1999; 
Desai, Chase-Lansdale, & Robert, 1989).  There is more agreement, however, that high-quality 
center-based care has positive effects on cognitive development, particularly for low-income children 
(NICHD & Duncan, 2003; Hill, Waldfogel, & Brooks-Gunn, 2002; Peisner-Feinberg et al., 2001).  
Finally, child care subsidies free up income for parents to spend on private consumption and goods 
that enhance child quality.  The extent to which additional income is spent on private consumption 
versus child quality depends on the relative size of the income elasticities          
This relationship is further complicated by the presence of several design features embedded 
in the CCDF that have implications for child care quality.  Arguably the most important design 
feature is the principle of “parental choice,” in which parents are free to use subsidies to purchase 
virtually any legally-operating child care provider, including those operating outside states’ 
regulatory regimes.  Furthermore, conditioning eligibility for subsidies on employment and income 
creates challenges for maintaining stable child care arrangements.  In particular, if changes in 
2 
 employment and income status are related to lapses in subsidy receipt, such instability could 
undermine child well-being by severing productive child-teacher relationships and exposing children 
to comparatively low-quality care during unsubsidized periods.  States’ reimbursement rates—or the 
maximum amount a state agency pays a given provider—can also influence quality.  If 
reimbursements are below the federally recommended level, families may not have access to high-
quality care, thereby reducing incentives for providers to make important quality enhancements.  In 
general, the aim of current subsidy policy is to support employment among low-income families, 
while placing few restrictions on the quality child care (Blau, 2001; Gormley, 2007).             
This paper represents the first attempt to study the implications of child care subsidy receipt 
for child development in the United States.  Our analyses draw on the Kindergarten cohort of the 
Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS-K) to examine a wide range of child outcomes, 
including cognitive, behavioral, and psychomotor well-being.  Our results indicate that child care 
subsidy receipt in the year before kindergarten leads to negative child outcomes at kindergarten 
entry.  For example, our best estimates suggest that children who receive subsidies score 0.29 and 
0.25 standard deviations lower on tests of reading and math ability, respectively.  These negative 
effects generally apply to several outcomes in the behavioral domain.  Furthermore, the impact of 
subsidies persists until the end of kindergarten.  While the data do not permit a detailed analysis of 
the mechanisms through which child care subsidies are detrimental to child development, we present 
descriptive evidence from the ECLS-K and discuss results from other studies that both point to poor 
child care quality as a possible explanation for the negative subsidy effects.  Implications of our 
findings are important because they suggest that the current child care subsidy system—with its 
overemphasis on employment—may undermine the development of children whose parents depend 




 II.        Overview of Child Care Subsidy Policy and Previous Research on Child Care 
The CCDF and Implications for Child Care Quality           
  To be eligible for CCDF funds, families must be engaged in a state-defined acceptable work 
activity (e.g., employment, education, or job training), have incomes below 85 percent of the state 
median income (SMI), and have at least one child ages 0 to 12.  States are given substantial 
flexibility in designing their subsidy systems, including the ability to transfer up to 30 percent of their 
TANF block grant to the CCDF, setting reimbursement and co-payment rates, and defining 
acceptable work activities. However, states must spend no less than four percent of their CCDF 
allocation on quality improvement activities, and a market rate survey must be conducted every two 
years to ensure that subsidy families have “equal access” to high-quality providers.
2     
As previously stated, there are several design features associated with the CCDF that have 
implications for the quality of child care purchased with subsidies.  The most important feature is the 
principle of “parental choice,” in which parents are free to use subsidies to pay for any legally-
operating child care provider, including unregulated relatives and other in-home caregivers.
3  To 
receive federal funds, providers are only required to be licensed if there is a state mandate, or they 
must meet basic health and safety regulations in cases where the state grants legal exemptions from 
licensing.  The increased flexibility through “parental choice” is beneficial for working parents, but 
allowing providers to accept subsidized children while operating outside states’ regulatory regime 
means that some children are exposed to low-quality care that is difficult to monitor (Adams, Tout, & 
Zaslow, 2007).  Mandating only minimum quality standards also reduces the incentive for providers 
to invest in costly quality improvements that support child development.                 
The CCDF’s emphasis on supporting employment may also influence the stability and 
quality of care received by low-income children.  As noted above, parental eligibility for subsidies is 
                                                 
2 Results from the survey are used to set reimbursements at a level that allows subsidized families to purchase child care up to the 75
th 
percentile of the local price distribution. 
3 Indeed, fully 25 percent of subsidized children participate in unregulated daycare settings (Child Care Bureau, 2005b). 
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 conditioned on employment and income, which means that parents lose eligibility if they become 
separated from a job, have earnings that exceed the threshold, or fail to comply with states’ 
recertification rules.  These eligibility rules can be at odds with children’s developmental needs.  
Recent evidence suggests that the median subsidy spell lasts only three to seven months (Meyers et 
al., 2002).  If lapses in subsidy receipt prompt frequent changes in child care arrangements when 
parents lose eligibility, such instability could have negative effects on child outcomes (Loeb et al., 
2004; Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000; Tran & Weinraub, 2006).   
  Linking subsidy eligibility to employment and income also creates challenges for providers 
to increase quality.  Child care providers that rely heavily on subsidized children as a source of 
revenue may experience severe fiscal shortfalls when parents lose eligibility or use their subsidy to 
pay another provider.  States’ use of rationing, waiting lists, and other tools to navigate the CCDF 
funding structure can be a further source of financial instability for child care providers.  Given the 
volatility associated with serving large numbers of subsidized children, providers have few incentives 
to make substantial quality improvements, especially those requiring a long-term commitment of 
sustained funding (e.g., higher wages, additional and high-skilled staff, and educational materials) 
(Adams & Rohacek, 2002).                                 
Finally, states’ CCDF regimes influence child care quality through reimbursement rates.   
Child care subsidies increase purchasing power by enabling low-income parents to afford a level of 
quality provided in the larger child care market.
4  The CCDF attempts to surmount the problem of 
low average quality by setting reimbursement rates at a level high enough to cover at least 75 percent 
of the prices charged in the local child care market.  Setting reimbursement rates at the 75
th percentile 
is a federal recommendation, however, leaving states with substantial flexibility to set lower benefit 
levels.  As of 2007, only nine states established reimbursement rates at the 75
th percentile of the local 
                                                 
4  Recent studies suggest, however, that average quality in U.S. child care settings tends to be mediocre and highly variable (Helburn et 
al., 1995; NICHD, 2000a; Phillips & Adams, 2001; Vandell & Wolfe, 2000). 
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 price distribution, compared to 22 states in 2001 (Schulman & Blank, 2007).  Low reimbursement 
rates limit parental access to high-quality providers, thereby decreasing demand for such services and 
weakening incentives for providers to raise quality.
5   
Previous Research  
The only other study to consider explicitly the role of child care subsidies in determining 
child outcomes is Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008).  The authors analyze the impact of Quebec’s 
“$5 per day child care” program on child care utilization, labor supply, and child and parent 
outcomes.  Their results show that, although this highly-subsidized child care program dramatically 
increased parental labor supply, it also had large, negative effects on children and parents.  In 
particular, children were worse off in a variety of behavioral and health dimensions, ranging from 
increased physical aggression and diminished social skills to increases in common illnesses.  The 
authors also find that the program led to more hostile and less consistent parenting, worse parental 
health, and lower-quality parental relationships.  Our study differs from Baker, Gruber, and Milligan 
(2008) in a number of ways.  First, we use data on sample of U.S. children.  Second, the U.S. subsidy 
system is different from the one examined in Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008).  The subsidies 
offered in Quebec are available for working and non-working parents, while the U.S. system is 
targeted at working parents.  In addition, the Quebec program is a universal entitlement, and child 
care subsidies in the U.S. are means-tested.  Finally, Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) investigate 
child and parent outcomes for a sample of two-parent families, while we focus on children living 
with single mothers. 
Although the literature on the effect of child care subsidies on child development is limited, 
there is a large number of studies examining the impact of child care utilization on children’s 
intellectual and social development (Baydar & Brooks-Gunn, 1991; Bernal & Keane, 2008; Blau, 
                                                 
5 States have addressed these incentive problems through tiered reimbursement rates, which provide higher rates to providers meeting 
more stringent quality standards.  One problem with this approach, however, is that states will only pay the higher rates after providers 
make the quality improvements, and therefore does not help low-quality providers make the initial financial investments. 
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 1999; Desai, Chase-Lansdale, & Robert, 1989; Hill, Waldfogel, & Brooks-Gunn, 2002; Loeb et al., 
2004; NICHD, 2003a; 2003b; 2000a; 2000b; NICHD & Duncan, 2003; Peisner-Feinberg et al., 
2001).
6  This body of work is relevant to our research because mothers respond to child care 
subsidies by moving children away from parent and relative care and into formal arrangements.  
Whether this substitution influences child outcomes positively or negatively depends on the relative 
productivity of parental care.  Formal child care many improve child well-being if these 
arrangements place children in safer and more stimulating environments.  However, significant time 
in these arrangements could lead to lower-quality mother-child interactions and less responsiveness 
of children to maternal sensitivity.            
Overall, these studies produce inconclusive results on the impact of center-based care on 
cognitive outcomes.   The diversity of findings is due, in part, to identification problems stemming 
from the treatment of child care choices as exogenous.  A recent study by Bernal and Keane (2008), 
however, addresses some of these self-selection issues by using welfare and other social policy 
reforms as instruments for a measure of child care time.  Using a sample of single mothers in the 
NLSY, the authors find that an additional year of child care attendance reduces cognitive ability test 
scores by 2.1 percent, or approximately 0.11 standard deviations.  Previous studies on social and 
emotional development generally find that children attending center-based care display more 
behavior problems and less self-control than children in other settings (NICHD, 2003b).  When 
studies are able to discern levels of child care quality, the results consistently suggest that children 
attending high-quality center-based care perform better on cognitive tests than children in family 
homes or relative care.   Moreover, the cognitive benefits of high-quality care are greater among 
children from disadvantaged backgrounds, a finding echoed by several random assignment studies 
evaluating states’ welfare-to-work programs (Crosby et al., 2005; Gennetian et al., 2005) as well 
                                                 
6 See Smolensky and Gootman (2003) for a thorough review of this research.    
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 recent work on state pre-kindergarten programs (Gormley & Gayer, 2005; Magnuson, Ruhm, & 
Waldfogel, 2007).   
A final strand of empirical work that is relevant to the current study focuses on the impact of 
early maternal employment on child development (Baum, 2002; Bernal, 2008; Blau & Grossberg, 
1992; Brooks-Gunn, Han, & Waldfogel, 2002; Desai, Chase-Lansdale and Michael, 1989; James-
Burdummy, 2005; Liu, Mroz, & Van der Klaauw, 2003; Ruhm, 2004; Waldfogel, Han, & Brooks-
Gunn, 2002).  Similar identification problems plague many of the studies in this literature.  However, 
a recent convergence of evidence finds that maternal work during the first three years of a child’s life 
is associated with small, negative effects on children’s cognitive ability.  Some of these negative 
effects persist until children reach kindergarten, but a general conclusion in the literature is that they 
attenuate over time, and are even offset by small, positive effects of later maternal employment.          
III.       Data Sources 
  The data used in the analysis are drawn from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, 
Kindergarten cohort (ECLS-K), a nationally representative sample of 21,260 children attending 
kindergarten in the fall of 1998.
7  Children in the ECLS-K are followed through the eighth grade, 
with detailed parent, child, and teacher interviews conducted in the fall and spring of kindergarten 
(1998 and 1999) and the spring of first (2000), third (2002), fifth (2004), and eighth (2007) grade.  
About 20 kindergartners per school from over 1,200 public and private schools are included in the 
sample.
8              
  Analyses in this study are based on the fall and spring of kindergarten waves of data 
                                                 
7 The ECLS-K is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education.  For more information, see the ECLS-K website at 
http://nces.ed.gov/ecls/kindergarten.asp.  An additional longitudinal study, the ECLS-Birth cohort, follows 14,000 children born in 2001 
through kindergarten entry.        
8 The ECLS-K used a multistage probability sample design to select the sample of children attending kindergarten in 1998. The primary 
sampling units (PSUs) were geographic areas consisting of counties or groups of counties. The second-stage consisted of public and 
private schools within sampled PSUs. The final stage units were students within schools.  The school frame was freshened in the spring 
of 1998 to include newly opened schools that were not included in the original sample.  Once the sample children were identified, parent 
contact information was obtained from the school, which was used to locate parents and seek consent for the child assessments and 
parent interviews.  Completion rates (or response rates that are conditioned on earlier stages of data collection) for the fall of 
kindergarten interviews were high: 89.9 percent of child assessments were completed, 85.3 percent of parent interviews were completed, 
and over 90 percent of the teacher interviews were completed.      
8 
 collection, in which child cognitive and behavioral assessments were conducted and parents were 
asked questions about child care attendance in the year prior to kindergarten entry.  We limit our 
sample to 2,795 children who lived with a single mother as of the fall of kindergarten interview.
9 We 
focus on single mothers because they constitute a majority of eligible subsidy recipients.  According 
to Herbst (2008a), 64 percent of eligible recipients are single mothers.  Exclusions from the sample 
are made if children were living in two-parent families (12,431) or missing data on one or more of 
the primary outcome variables (4,421), child care arrangements (1,189), and child care subsidy 
questions (27).  We exclude an additional 335 children attending Head Start, since the decision to 
participate in this early intervention program in is not influenced by child care subsidies.
10  Rates of 
item non-response on the remaining child and family variables are low, usually well below one 
percent of the final sample, and we retained these cases by imputing zeros for the missing values and 
creating dummy variables to control for the possibility of non-random imputation.   
Child Outcomes 
  We explore a large set of child outcomes, broadly organized around cognitive, behavioral, 
and psychomotor categories.  In the cognitive domain, reading and math tests were administered to 
all children in the fall of kindergarten.
11  The reading test was designed to measure language and 
literacy skills, such as print familiarity, letter recognition, beginning and ending sounds, vocabulary, 
                                                 
9 Single mothers were identified in the ECLS-K by using the variable P1HPARNT, which describes the child’s living arrangements.  We 
defined single mother families as those in which the child lived with the “biological mother only.” 
10 Additional minor exclusions from the sample were made due to missing zip code identifiers, an inability to match children to the 2000 
Census geocoded data, and mothers under age 19.  A number of researchers drop children who were not first-time kindergarteners.  
However, we decided to retain these children and add a control for their presence in all models.  In any case, they comprise a small 
number of the total analysis sample (147).          
11 The reading and math tests were designed specifically for use in the ECLS-K.  However, many of the individual items are derived 
from existing instruments, all with high reliability scores.  For example, instruments such as the Peabody Individual Achievement Test—
Revised (PIAT-R), Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test—3 (PPVT-3), and the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery—Revised 
(WJ-R) were drawn from to create the ECLS-K measures.  Overall reading and math scores can be broken down into proficiency scores, 
which provide a means of analyzing specific skills or content areas.  Reading scores are comprised of proficiencies in letter recognition, 
beginning sounds, ending sounds, sight words, and words in context.  Math scores are comprised of proficiencies in numbers and shapes, 
relative size, sequencing, addition/subtraction, and multiplication/division.  In addition to the reading and math tests, the ECLS-K 
cognitive battery also includes a general knowledge test designed to capture children’s “conceptual understanding of scientific facts, and 
skills and abilities to form questions about the natural world, to try to answer them on the basis of the tools and the evidence collected, 
and to communicate answer and how the answers were obtained.”  The ECLS-K does not provide proficiency scores for the general 
knowledge test, and its reliability scores are consistently below the other cognitive tests.  Therefore, we limit our analyses to the reading 
and math scores.   
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 and reading comprehension.  The math test evaluated identification of one- and two-digit numerals, 
recognition of geometric shapes, counting and reading numerals, pattern and sequence recognition, 
and solving simple word problems.  Reading and math outcomes are transformations of the raw 
scores into T-scores, which are population-referenced measures of children’s achievement.  As a 
result, these scores are interpreted in relation to a given child’s peer group.  For ease of 
interpretation, T-scores are scaled to have (for the full sample) a mean of 50 and a standard deviation 
of 10. Effect sizes are therefore derived by dividing all parameter estimates by 10.  Reliabilities for 
both cognitive tests are high (0.93 for reading and 0.92 for math).   
In the behavioral domain, we explore teachers’ subjective reports of children’s internalizing 
behavior problems, externalizing behavior problems, approaches to learning, self-control, and 
interpersonal behavior.
12  The Internalizing Behavior Scale asks about the frequency with which 
children display anxiety, loneliness, low self-esteem, and sadness (four items).  The Externalizing 
Behavior Scale inquires about the frequency of acting out behaviors, including arguing, fighting, 
anger, and impulsive behavior (five items).  The Approaches to Learning Scale measures behavior 
reflecting the ease children display in the learning environment, including attentiveness, task 
persistence, and eagerness to learn (six items).  The Self-Control Scale measures the extent to which 
children are capable of controlling behavior by respecting the property of others, limiting temper, and 
responding appropriately to peer-pressure (four items).  Finally, the Interpersonal Skills Scale 
provides information on children’s ability to form and maintain friendships, comfort or help others, 
and show sensitivity toward one’s peers (five items).  All of the behavioral outcomes are measured 
on a scale of one to four.  Higher scores on the Internalizing and Externalizing Behavior Scales 
indicate more frequent behavior problems, while higher scores on the remaining scales indicate 
                                                 
12 Teachers were also asked to respond to several questions about children’s academic performance. This academic rating scale (ARS) 
provides information in areas of language and literacy, general knowledge, and mathematical thinking.  However, we limit our outcome 
list to teachers’ assessments of social skills.  Furthermore, in the fall of kindergarten, parents were asked about children’s social skills in 
many of the same domains as teachers.  Reliabilities for these assessments are often substantially below that of the teacher assessments, 
and so we chose to concentrate on teachers’ evaluations of children’s social skills.         
10 
 increasingly positive behavior.  These measures are scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 10.  Reliabilities are once again high (0.80 for Internalizing Behavior, 0.90 for 
Externalizing Behavior, 0.89 for Approaches to Learning: 0.89, 0.79 for Self-Control, and 0.89 for 
Interpersonal Skills). 
The final set of outcomes explored in the study focus on children’s psychomotor skills, 
specifically fine and gross motor skills.  Fine motor skills capture hand-eye coordination and include 
such tasks as building a gate, drawing a person, and copying simple figures.  The test of gross motor 
skills evaluates children in the areas of balancing, hopping, skipping and walking backward.  Fine 
motor skills are measured on a scale of zero to nine, and gross motor skills are measured on a scale of 
zero to eight, with higher scores indicating greater abilities.  As with the behavioral outcomes, these 
measures are scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 10.  Reliability scores for 
these measures are 0.57 for fine motor skills and 0.51 for gross motor skills.   
Measures of Child Care Subsidy Receipt and Child Care Arrangements 
The key independent variable in our analysis is a dummy variable indicating whether a child 
received subsidized, non-parental child care in the year prior to kindergarten.  Parents are asked a 
series of questions about child care use during the past 12 months, including the number of 
arrangements, the amount of time (i.e., months, days, and hours) that each arrangement was used, 
whether there was a cost associated with each arrangement, and if so, the amount paid for care.  
Regarding subsidy receipt, parents were asked the following: “Did any of the following people or 
organizations help to pay for this … provider to care for {CHILD} the year before {he/she} started 
kindergarten?”  Four possible choices were then presented to parents, and we coded those answering 
“a social service agency or welfare office” as receiving a child care subsidy.  Similar questions 
appear in several nationally representative surveys (e.g., National Survey of America’s Families and 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation), and other researchers have constructed indicators 
of subsidy receipt based on them (Blau and Tekin, 2007; Herbst, 2008a; Tekin, 2007).  The U.S. 
11 
 Department of Health and Human Services (1999) finds that between 12 percent and 15 percent of 
eligible families received a CCDF subsidy in 1998.  In our ECLS-K sample, 14.8 percent of children 
are coded as receiving subsidized care during the same period, further increasing our confidence in 
the measure.
13  
We also create mutually exclusive groupings of child care arrangements.  Specifically, we 
code children as having attended relative care (which includes caregiving inside and outside the 
child’s home), non-relative care (nanny, babysitter, or family-based), center-based care (daycare 
center), or school-based services (prekindergarten, preschool, and nursery school).  Children who did 
not attend any of these services are coded as receiving exclusively parent care.  A non-trivial number 
of children received child care from more than one provider, so we create a decision rule to ensure 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.
14  Participation rates in the various child care 
arrangements are as follows: 14.6 percent of children received no non-parental care (parent care 
only); 22 percent received care from a relative; 7.2 percent received care from a non-relative; 16.3 
percent participated in center-based care; and 39.9 percent participated in a school-based program.               
Child and Family Characteristics, Contextual Factors, and the Policy Context 
  We exploit the richness of the ECLS-K to control for a detailed vector of child and family 
characteristics as of the fall of kindergarten.  Key child characteristics include age, race, and birth 
weight.  Parental time and skill inputs are captured by mother’s age, lagged maternal employment, 
mother’s and father’s educational attainment, and parent’s educational expectations for the child.  
Parental resources and other goods inputs are represented by WIC and food stamps participation, 
                                                 
13 Rates of child care subsidy receipt calculated by researchers using the NSAF match closely our ECLS-K estimate. For example, Tekin 
(2007) calculates a participation rate of 11.6 percent for a sample of single mothers, and Herbst (2008a) estimates a take-up rate of 13.9 
percent, also from a sample of single mothers.   
14 Our decision rule is constructed so that we drop only those children who receive exclusively Head Start.  Therefore, our indicator of 
subsidy receipt omits those reporting subsidy receipt while participating only in Head Start.  However, our comparisons are similar when 
we estimated our models labeling these mothers as subsidy recipients.  A child participating in Head Start along with another service is 
coded as participating in the non-Head Start service.  The remaining tie-breakers are settled as follows: relative and center: center; non-
relative and center: center; relative and school: school; non-relative and school: school; non-relative, relative, and center: center; non-
relative, relative, and school: school.      
12 
 total household income, and the number of books and audio CDs/tapes available in the home.
15  
Finally, all models control for a number of child and family background characteristics.  These 
include indicators of early and current child health as well as developmental setbacks, specifically, 
whether the child was born prematurely, the child’s current weight, whether the child repeated 
kindergarten, and the presence of disabilities.
16  This vector also contains family attributes that 
indirectly proxy time inputs and other resources, such as the age of the mother as of the first birth, the 
number of siblings in the household, and region of residence.                
  Although the ECLS-K asks parents a number of questions about subjective neighborhood 
quality, we control for contextual determinants of child outcomes by appending zip code-level 
Census data to our main data file.  These variables are derived from the 2000 Decennial Census’ long 
form, and are obtained by researchers through a restricted use data agreement.  We incorporate 12 
variables at the zip code-level into our analyses, including median household income, population 
density, the fraction of households receiving public assistance, racial and ethnic composition, percent 
foreign born, female employment rates, and educational attainment.   
  A final set of variables included in our analysis attempts to capture the state-level social 
policy environment in which children are raised and which have implications for single mothers’ 
employment decisions.  Although the ECSL-K provides information on early and current child care 
experiences, data covering maternal employment is incomplete.  Therefore, we use a number of 
welfare and other social policy reforms implemented throughout the 1990s to account for unobserved 
                                                 
15 We also experimented with a more extensive variable list, including a composite measure of socioeconomic status, which was 
constructed by ECLS-K staff and comprises parental education, occupation, and family income.  This was ultimately excluded from the 
analysis, given that we include most of its constituent parts in the analysis.  Our results are not sensitive to this exclusion.  Furthermore, 
we experimented with a number of parent-child activities, such as frequency of reading, storytelling, playing games and sports, and 
participating in nature activities.  Another cluster of potential variables included the extent to which parents thought it was important to 
have certain skills (e.g., counting and knowing letters) at the time of kindergarten entry.  Finally, we considered additional family context 
variables, such as whether the child moved at all since birth and whether the current home location was chosen because of the school 
system.  These variables are inconsistently associated with the outcomes, and removing them did not alter the results.           
16 We define disability status using an ECLS-K composite variable.  It includes individual questions on whether the child ever received 
any form of therapy before kindergarten, or had a learning, activity, mobility, speech, hearing, or vision problem diagnosed by a 
professional.     
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 work preferences that may be correlated with child outcomes.
17  Furthermore, these policy reforms 
should capture heterogeneity in state resources and attitudes influencing child development.  These 
variables include the maximum AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of three, the combined 
federal/state EITC maximum credit, a dummy variable for whether a state has a lifetime time limit on 
welfare receipt, the number of months for states' time limits, a dummy variable for whether a state 
has an immediate work requirement, child age exemption from work requirements, a dummy for 
whether a state has a full family welfare sanction for the first instance of non-compliance with work 
requirements, and a dummy variable for whether a state operates a formal cash diversion program, 
and state pre-kindergarten spending per child ages 0 to 4.        
IV.        Conceptual Framework and Econometric Model 
  Our goal is to examine the relationship between child care subsidy receipt and children’s 
cognitive, behavioral, and psychomotor outcomes at the start of kindergarten.  These outcomes are 
determined by a child development production function whose inputs include purchased goods (e.g., 
food, books, medical care, etc.), the quality of non-parental child care, and the market and non-
market time of parents.  Economists have estimated variations of this production function to examine 
the impact of pre-kindergarten (Magnusson et al. 2007), child care inputs (Blau 1999), child care use 
and income (Bernal & Keane, 2008), and parental employment (Ruhm, 2004) on various measures of 
child well-being.   
Rather than entering into the production function as a direct input, child care subsidies are 
assumed to influence child outcomes indirectly by affecting the mix of inputs toward purchased 
goods, non-parental child care, and the time allocation of parents.  This is a plausible assumption 
because child care subsidies are essentially an in-kind benefit that enters parents’ optimization 
problem through the budget and time constraints.  In this framework, a decrease in the price of child 
                                                 
17 A large literature investigates the impact of welfare reform, the EITC, and policy reforms on single mothers’ labor supply decisions, 
consistently finding strong associations (e.g., Fang and Keane, 2004; Grogger, 2003; Herbst, 2008b; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001).       
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 care is predicted to raise the likelihood that a parent will work and use paid child care by increasing 
the effective wage rate and making formal care relatively cheaper (Blau & Currie, 2004; Blau & 
Robins, 1988; 1991; Kimmel, 1998; Tekin, 2007).  A child care subsidy therefore encourages parents 
to enter the paid labor force because it lowers the price of care.  
As previously stated, a child care subsidy can influence child outcomes through several 
mechanisms.  First, the income available for private consumption and purchasing goods to enhance 
child quality increases when families receive a subsidy.  This is due to the positive effect of subsidies 
on employment, and the fact that these benefits release money that can be directed toward purchases 
other than child care.  It is straightforward to show that the effect of an in-kind service is equivalent 
to a pure income transfer, in that it causes a parallel and outward shift in the budget constraint.  
Parents will therefore respond by increasing both private consumption and purchases for child-
quality-enhancing goods and services.
18 The extent to which increases in disposable income is spent 
on private consumption as opposed to child quality depends on the relative size of the income 
elasticities.   
Second, child care subsidies reduce the amount of time children spend with their parents, 
while increasing the amount of time in nonparental child care.  Although increased spending on 
quality enhancing goods is predicted to be beneficial for child development, the impact of reduced 
maternal time depends on the relative quality of maternal versus nonparental child care.  Evidence on 
the effect of maternal employment and child care is inconclusive.  However, a key determinant of 
this relative productivity is the way in which the CCDF influences access to high-quality providers.  
As the previous section makes clear, there are several design features associated with the CCDF that 
raise concerns about the level of child care quality received by subsidized children.  Overall, it is 
                                                 
18 This is true under the plausible assumption that both are normal goods.  Note that the additional expenditures on child care will be less 
than the amount of the subsidy due to the income effect. 
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 unclear a priori whether subsidies are beneficial or detrimental to child development, and so this is 
ultimately an empirical question.   
By substituting subsidy receipt into the non-market time of parents and non-parental child 
care quality, we can represent child outcomes as a function of child care subsidy receipt.  Thus, our 
goal is to obtain reduced form parameters of the relationship between child outcomes and subsidy 
receipt.  We start with an econometric model as follows: 
 Y i = Xiβ + αSi + εi,                                     (1) 
where Yi is one of nine measures of child development taken for child i in the fall and spring of 
kindergarten; Si is an indicator for child care subsidy receipt in the year before kindergarten; Xi is a 
vector of exogenous determinants of child outcomes; and εi is a disturbance term.  Note that α is an 
estimate of the net effect of child care subsidies on child development.  It represents the combined 
effect that takes place through parents’ altered time and budget constraints, as well as supply-side 
limitations on the ability to purchase quality care, both of which are predicted to have implications 
for child development.    
Estimating equation (1) with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will yield a biased estimate 
of α if the unobserved determinants of child outcomes are correlated with child care subsidy receipt.  
For example, mothers who seek and obtain a subsidy (as well as those who work and use nonparental 
child care) may be systematically different from those who do not in ways that are not observed by 
researchers.  If high-skilled mothers are more likely to work and have high-skilled children, then 
failing to control for maternal productivity would lead to an upward bias of α.  Another selection 
mechanism deals with the possibility that mothers take children’s cognitive ability, temperament, and 
economic circumstances into consideration when deciding whether to work and obtain a child care 
subsidy.  If mothers differentially select work and child care choices based on unobserved child 
characteristics, the coefficient on subsidy receipt, α, will once again be biased.       
  We take a number of steps to guard against bias from unobserved heterogeneity.  First, we 
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 exploit the richness of the ECLS-K data to control for an extensive set of child and family 
characteristics.  Second, we incorporate detailed zip code-level and state social policy controls into 
the model.  The purpose of these variables is to account for environmental and policy determinants of 
preferences for employment and child care that may influence child outcomes.  Finally, we estimate 
models using Two-Stage Least Squares (2-SLS).  To implement this approach, we rely on exclusion 
restrictions to identify the subsidy coefficient, α, in equation (1).  Specifically, we need at least one 
instrument that is correlated with child care subsidy receipt, but uncorrelated with child outcomes.  
We use variables that determine how subsidies are rationed by state and local administrators under 
the assumption that child outcomes are orthogonal to the rationing mechanism, conditional on 
subsidy receipt status.  Furthermore, we assume that rationing is conducted at the county level and 
therefore use county dummies as identifying instruments (Blau & Tekin, 2007).    
  A number of recent studies provide evidence that local subsidy administrators have 
substantial autonomy to interpret federal and state policy, as well as the authority to shape policy 
decisions with little oversight (Layzer & Collins, 2000; Blank et al., 2001; Mitchell et al., 1997).  
Appendix Table 1 shows that child care subsidy programs in all but seven states (Arizona, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and South Dakota) are 
administered by county welfare or social service agencies.
19  In at least three states (Colorado, New 
York, and Texas), subsidy policy and administration are largely determined by county agencies, 
while another two states (Florida and Virginia) allow such agencies to establish local eligibility 
criteria.  Perhaps the most common policy decision devolved to local agencies is establishing 
reimbursement rates, with counties in 38 states having the authority to do so.  Appendix Table 1 also 
presents examples of administrative tools used by states to ration subsidies: creating wait lists/frozen 
intake (17 states) and providing an entitlement for TANF families (16 states).  Such policies are 
critical to determining the mix of low-income families that access child care assistance.  Thus, we 
                                                 
19 In some states, the subsidy program is operated by regional agencies, which typically include groups of counties.   
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 believe that the combination of local administration and rationing makes the county identifiers 
plausible candidates for explaining variation in child care subsidy receipt.             
This identification strategy will be invalid if the county dummies cannot be appropriately 
excluded from equation (1).  For example, state and local government policies may influence child 
outcomes through mechanisms that are outside the child care subsidy system.  If states and localities 
with generous subsidy benefits are also more likely to offer pre-kindergarten programs and other 
child-related benefits, then our identification strategy will be invalid if these programs are not 
accounted for in the estimation.  In order to guard against this possibility, we include in some models 
21 zip code-level and state policy variables that proxy the ability and determination of state and local 
governments to influence child outcomes.
20  
Although the ECLS-K provides researchers with a rich set of information on children’s early 
cognitive and behavioral development, it is important to mention some drawbacks associated with 
these data.  First, with the exception of a single measure of early parental employment, the ECLS-K 
does not collect detailed information on parents’ work histories.  A related concern is that we are 
unable to account for earnings and other income sources over the first few years of a child’s life.  
Second, information on children’s early child care experiences is missing as well.  In fact, the only 
historical child care data available in the ECLS-K focus on the age at which children began 
participating in nonparental care.  A final drawback is that direct measures of child care quality are 
missing for children’s arrangements in the year before kindergarten entry.  One might therefore be 
concerned that our estimated subsidy effects are confounded with early maternal work, income, and 
child care quality.  We attempt to assess the implications of these missing data by undertaking a 
number of systematic specification checks.  However, there are reasons to be suspicious of 
incorporating such controls into the current analysis.  It is well-known that maternal employment, 
                                                 
20 Blau and Tekin (2007) provide evidence that county identifiers might be plausible instruments for identifying the effect of subsidy 
receipt on maternal employment.  They predict subsidy receipt probabilities for women who are not mothers in their sample.  Since these 
women are ineligible for subsidies, subsidy receipt estimated from a model using country dummies as identifiers should not have 
significant effects on the employment for these mothers.  Their test provides no evidence against the identifying assumptions. 
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 income, and child care quality are each endogenous to child outcomes, and dealing with them in 
addition to the endogeneity of subsidy receipt would add undue complexity to the empirical analysis.  
As others have noted, finding plausible instruments for maternal employment and child care, in 
particular, is a difficult task (Blau & Tekin, 2007; Bernal & Keane, 2008).  Furthermore, measures of 
maternal work and child care time are highly correlated for single mothers, making it difficult to 
distill their independent effects (Bernal & Keane, 2008).  Finally, excluding these factors allows us to 
concentrate on the overall impact of child care subsidies, which we argue is the parameter of interest 
from a policy perspective.   
V.        Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents means for the outcome variables across subsidized and unsubsidized 
children in the ECLS-K.  The figures reported in the table are weighed using the appropriate sample 
weight.  Note that the reading and math scores of children in our sample are slightly below the mean 
for the full ECLS-K sample, with average scores of about 48.  This is not surprising, given that the 
sample consists of children living in single-parent families.  The table also shows that subsidized 
children perform worse than their counterparts in every domain, and most of these differences persist 
to the spring of kindergarten.  In fact, tests of the null hypothesis of no difference between subsidy 
recipients and non-recipients are rejected for six of nine outcomes in the fall of kindergarten and six 
of seven outcomes in the spring of kindergarten.  One should interpret these results with caution, as 
they do not adjust for any differences between subsidy recipients and non-recipients.  Some of these 
poorer outcomes could reflect the possibility that subsidized children come from socially and 
economically disadvantaged backgrounds, an issue we explore next.   
    Table 2 displays summary statistics for the full set of variables used in the analysis.  These 
results are presented for the entire sample and separately for subsidy recipients and non-recipients.  
As expected, subsidized children are much more likely to be placed in center care than non-
recipients.  More than 41 percent of subsidy recipients participate in center-based arrangements, 
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 while only 12 percent of non-recipients are in such care. Subsidy recipients are also more heavily 
represented in other modes of non-relative care (nine percent versus seven percent).  Non-recipients 
are mostly cared for by relatives and parents: fully 41 percent of non-recipient children receive care 
in either of these settings.     
Interestingly, the table draws a mixed picture about the social and economic environments 
from which subsidy recipients and non-recipients are drawn.  Subsidy recipients appear to be more 
disadvantaged on the basis of whether the mother was a teenager at first birth and whether she 
received food stamps.  Furthermore, recipient families have fewer resources that may positively 
influence child development, as measured by the number of children’s books, tapes, and CDs 
available in the home.  On the other hand, subsidized children are no more likely to be born 
prematurely and are less likely to have low birth weights.  Subsidized families have lower incomes, 
on average, which is not surprising given states’ eligibility threshold.  However, a closer look at 
family income reveals a non-linear relationship between income and subsidy receipt.  In particular, 
families in the middle of the income distribution are more likely to receive a subsidy than those from 
other categories, indicating that subsidized families are not drawn disproportionately from the most 
disadvantaged backgrounds.  A similarly complex relationship emerges when one compares 
educational attainment.  Mothers of subsidized children are less likely to be high school drop-outs 
(13 percent versus 18 percent) and more likely to have some college education (40 percent versus 34 
percent).  On the other hand, mothers of unsubsidized children are more likely to have a bachelor’s 
degree or more (11 percent versus 5 percent).     
A final piece of descriptive evidence points to a reasonable amount of observational 
equivalence between subsidy recipients and non-recipients.  The ECLS-K produces an index of 
socioeconomic status (SES), which combines mother’s and father’s education, mother’s and father’s 
occupational status, and total family income.  According to this measure, subsidized and 
unsubsidized families are equally represented in every SES quintile but the top one.  Even here, 
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 however, the difference is not quantitatively large (five percent versus 11 percent).              
  In sum, although it appears that subsidized children are drawn from disadvantaged social and 
economic backgrounds, they are not disproportionately represented in the lowest SES quintiles.  This 
is not surprising, given that the process of navigating the subsidy system probably requires 
substantial motivation and skill.  Moreover, that the observable characteristics of subsidized families 
indicate that they are not negatively selected is interesting in light of the raw outcome differences 
between subsidized and unsubsidized children.  Such a pattern is an initial piece of evidence that 
mechanisms outside the family context could be responsible for the poorer outcomes of subsidized 
children.                 
Results from OLS regressions of the fall of kindergarten child outcomes on child care 
subsidy receipt are presented in Table 3.  Column (1) shows the subsidy coefficient for separate 
regressions that control for the child and family characteristics presented in Table 2.
21  Column (2) 
adds the state-level policy variables that are assumed to influence child outcomes, while column (3) 
incorporates the zip code-level variables that further account for local policy and attitudinal 
differences affecting child development.    
As shown in Table 3, many of the differences in child outcomes between subsidy recipients 
and non-recipients disappear once the observable characteristics of children and families are added to 
the model.  Specifically, differences in reading test scores, approaches to learning, self-control, 
interpersonal skills, and gross motor skills between subsidized and unsubsidized children are 
rendered statistically insignificant in column (1).  Subsidy receipt, however, continues to be 
associated with increases in externalizing behavior problems, with the coefficient indicating that 
subsidies increase the frequency of such behavior by 0.1 standard deviations.  With the exception of 
self-control, adding the state policy and zip code-level controls does not alter the results.  As shown 
in column (2) and (3), the coefficient on subsidy receipt becomes statistically significant in the self-
                                                 
21 The only variables omitted from Table 2 are the indicators of child care participation.   
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 control model, once again implying that subsidized children display more behavior problems.  The 
magnitude of the subsidy coefficient in the externalizing behavior model is unchanged, and continues 
to be statistically significant at conventional levels.   
 Results from the fall 2-SLS models are presented in Appendix Table 2 (first-stage subsidy 
receipt equation) and Table 4 (second-stage child outcome equations).  Looking first at the model 
predicting subsidy receipt, our results are consistent with previous studies (Blau & Tekin, 2007; 
Herbst, 2008a; Meyers, Heintze, & Wolf, 2002).  Black children and those with multiple siblings are 
more likely to receive a subsidy.  Mother’s education is positively correlated with the likelihood of 
subsidy receipt, which is consistent with the story that considerable knowledge and skill may be 
necessary to navigate the application process and deal with local government agencies.  Early 
maternal employment is a positive predictor of subsidy receipt, reflecting the fact that CCDF child 
care subsidies are tied to participation in work-related activities.  Finally, families receiving WIC and 
food stamps are more likely to obtain subsidies.  That the likelihood of subsidy receipt is greater 
among employed mothers and those with some attachment to other means-tested programs has been 
documented elsewhere (Herbst, 2008a).  To evaluate the strength of the identifying instruments, we 
calculate the partial R
2 and conduct an F-test for the joint significance of the county dummies.  The 
R
2 increases by 0.09 when the county dummies are added to the model, and the F-test yields a highly 
significant 24.33, more than twice the guideline suggested by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) to 
avoid weak instruments.  Such findings suggest that our instruments are capable of leveraging 
sufficient identifying variation to estimate fairly precise subsidy effects.            
Turning to the second-stage results, we find that nearly all of the subsidy coefficients imply 
poorer cognitive, behavioral, and psychomotor outcomes.  Once again, adding the state policy and 
zip code-level controls does not appreciably change the results, so we focus our interpretations on the 
full model [column (3)].  Children receiving subsidized care have reading test scores that are 2.9 
points lower than unsubsidized children.  This translates to an effect size of 0.29 standard deviations.  
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 Similarly, subsidy recipients score 2.5 points lower than non-recipients on the standardized math test, 
translating to an effect size of 0.25 standard deviations.  In the behavioral domain, subsidy receipt is 
consistently associated with increased behavior problems.  In fact, the coefficient on subsidies for 
approaches to learning and self-control imply sizeable negative effects.  Our estimates suggest that 
subsidized children experience reductions in these positive behaviors of about one-third of a standard 
deviation.  Interestingly, subsidy receipt is no longer statistically significant for externalizing 
behavior in the 2-SLS models, while the coefficient is large (and negative) but imprecisely estimated 
for interpersonal skills and gross motor skills. 
It is useful to put these effect sizes into context.  Bernal and Keane’s (2008) analysis of 
preschool-aged children (of single mothers) in the NLSY finds that an additional year of nonparental 
child care use is associated with a reduction of 0.11 standard deviations in children’s cognitive test 
scores.  Conversely, low-skilled mothers whose children participate in formal care for an additional 
year experience increases of 0.25 standard deviations in cognitive test scores.  Baker, Gruber, and 
Milligan’s (2008) study of Quebec’s child care program finds that subsidized children show a decline 
in social development of 0.17 standard deviations.  Recent work on state pre-kindergarten programs 
also provides useful benchmarks.  Gormley and Gayer’s (2005) evaluation of Tulsa, Oklahoma’s 
program finds effect sizes of 0.39 (cognitive ability), 0.38 (language ability), and 0.24 (motor skills) 
standard deviations.  Finally, Magnuson, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2007) estimate effect sizes of 0.24 
(reading test), 0.20 (math test), -0.18 (self-control), and 0.24 (externalizing behavior) standard 
deviations for pre-kindergarten attendance among ECLS-K children.  Thus, it appears that the 
absolute value of our subsidy estimates is similar to those from other early childhood intervention 
programs. 
Specification Checks 
The results discussed so far indicate a negative relationship between child care subsidy 
receipt in the year before kindergarten and child outcomes measured during the fall of kindergarten.  
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 We now present results from several specification checks that examine the robustness of our initial 
findings (Table 5 and Table 6).    
To assess whether these effects persist beyond the fall of kindergarten, we re-estimate our 
models using child outcomes measured during the spring of kindergarten interview.  Results from 
these models are presented in column (1) and (3) of Table 5.  Column (1) displays the subsidy 
coefficients from the OLS models, and column (3) displays the subsidy coefficients from the 2-SLS 
models.  Note that we estimate these models using the specification that includes the zip code-level 
and state policy variables.  As illustrated in column (1), the OLS coefficients are largely consistent 
with those in Table 3. There is a negative and statistically significant effect of subsidy receipt on self-
control.  The remaining coefficients are not estimated with much precision.  While the OLS results 
do not point to a consistent pattern, the 2-SLS estimates presented in column (3) clearly suggest a 
negative effect of subsidy receipt that persists to the end of kindergarten.  The coefficients on reading 
test scores, math test scores, and self-control are negative and significant, indicating that subsidy 
receipt reduces cognitive ability and increases behavior problems.  The coefficients on approaches to 
learning and interpersonal skills are negative, again suggesting that subsidies are associated with 
worse behavioral outcomes, although neither coefficient is estimated precisely.  Only the estimates 
for internalizing and externalizing behavior point to a positive effect of subsidy receipt, but neither is 
statistically significant. 
As another attempt to guard against bias from unobserved heterogeneity, we take advantage 
of the fact that child outcomes in the ECLS-K are measured during multiple interviews.  This allows 
us to estimate models with lagged dependent variables, which further account for unobservables that 
are correlated with child care subsidy receipt and child outcomes (Blau & Tekin, 2007).
22  T o  
                                                 
22 Conceptually, these models can be derived from a specification which posits that current child development (Yit) is determined by 
subsidy receipt in all the previous periods, beginning with the most recent one.  That is, 
 
Yit =  µ + αSit-1 + λαSit-2 + λ
2αSit-3 + λ
3αSit-4 +,…,+ εit.                                                     (2A)  
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 implement this approach, we estimate OLS and 2-SLS regressions of spring of kindergarten child 
outcomes on subsidy receipt, the full set of exogenous controls, and the appropriate lagged dependent 
variable (fall of kindergarten child outcome).  Subsidy coefficients from these models are displayed 
column (2) and (4) of Table 5.  Most of the OLS estimates, in column (2), point to a negative effect 
of subsidy receipt, although only the coefficient in the self-control model is statistically significant.  
The 2-SLS estimates, in column (4), also point to consistent negative effects.  In particular, we find 
that subsidy recipients score 1.6 points lower than non-recipients on the reading test and 2.9 points 
lower on the math test, translating to effect sizes of 0.16 and 0.29, respectively.  While most of the 
subsidy coefficients continue to point to negative effects in the behavioral domain, none of the 
estimates are measured precisely enough to be statistically significant.   
  Table 6 presents additional results that check the sensitivity of our findings to different 
specifications.  The first row in this table shows the baseline subsidy results, which come from 
column (3) in Table 4.  The second row restricts the analysis to states with clear evidence of county 
administration of child care subsidy programs.  Specifically, we use the information in Appendix 
Table 1 to exclude states that do not meet two of the following three criteria: county-level variation 
in administration, eligibility determination, or reimbursement rates.
23  Our results do not change after 
restricting the sample in this manner.  In fact, the coefficients on subsidy receipt become more 
significant despite a 20 percent reduction in the sample size.  Note that the subsidy coefficient for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Note that if λ<1, then the influence of subsidy receipt on child development becomes smaller as one goes back further into the past.  
Multiplying (2) by λ and lagging by one period results in: 
 
λYit-1 =  λµ + λαSit-2 + λ
2αSit-3 + λ
3αSit-4 + λ
4αSit-5 + ,…,+ λεit-1.                                                                                  (2B)  
 
Subtracting (2B) from (2A) and re-arranging the terms yields 
 
Yit =  π + λYit-1 + αSit-1 + ωit,                                                              (3)  
  
where π = µ(1 – λ) and ωit=(εit - λ εit-1).  We augment (3) by adding the controls in (1) to estimate the following equation: 
 
Yit = π + λ Yit-1 + αSit-1 + Xiβ  + ωit.                                                                                                                                                              (4)  
23 Applying these criteria eliminates 16 states from the analysis: Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  We 
also experimented with models that applied only the first of these criteria (county-level administration).  The results are very similar to 
those discussed in the text.     
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 interpersonal skills is now statistically significant at the 10 percent level, while the coefficient for 
gross motor skills is marginally significant (p=0.109).  The increase in statistical significance is 
expected since the instrument presumably becomes less noisy once we eliminate from our sample 
states with questionable variation in local control over subsidy policy and administration.   We argue 
that the pattern exhibited in the second row of Table 6 provides more evidence in support of our 
identification strategy.  
The next three rows in Table 6 attempt to deal with some of the drawbacks associated with 
missing data on child care quality and parental employment.  To account for differences in child care 
quality across subsidy recipients and non-recipients, we add nine controls for states’ child care 
regulations, including child-staff ratios and maximum group sizes.
24  Given that these regulations 
vary across children in different states, the subsidy effects are still not adjusted for differential quality 
within child care institutions or classrooms for a given state.  Nevertheless, the results indicate that 
the impact of subsidy receipt is robust to cross-state differences in regulation-based child care 
quality.    Results in rows 3 and 4 assess the influence of missing parental work histories in the 
ECLS-K.  In particular, we use as a proxy for early maternal work dummy variables indicating 
whether children began nonparental care arrangements during the first three years of life.  We also 
add an indicator for mothers’ contemporaneous employment status, along with the control for lagged 
employment.  As shown in rows 3 and 4, adding these variables does not appreciably change our 
results. 
Interpretation of Empirical Results  
By accounting for the endogeneity of child care subsidy receipt, we mitigate the influence of 
unobserved child and family characteristics that are correlated with measures of child well-being.  An 
                                                 
24 The full set of regulation controls is the following: center child-staff ratios for four-year-olds; family child-staff ratios for four-year-
olds; center maximum group size for four-year-olds; family maximum group size for four-year-olds; a dummy variables that equals unity 
if center directors are required to have at least a BA degree; a dummy variables that equals unity if center/family child care staff are 
required to enroll in child development coursework; a dummy variables that equals unity if center/family staff are required to undergo a 
criminal background check; a dummy variables that equals unity if center/family indoor space is regulated by states; and a dummy 
variables that equals unity if states can impose a fine on center/family providers for failing to comply with regulations. 
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 important question is why subsidies continue to influence child outcomes even after removing 
systematic differences between subsidized and unsubsidized children.  In this section, we elaborate 
further on the mechanisms through which subsidies might have detrimental effects on children.  The 
thrust of our discussion focuses on the stability and intensity of child care use during the period 
ECLS-K children received subsidized care (i.e., the year prior to kindergarten entry).  We then turn 
our attention to summarizing previous research on overall child care quality in the U.S., as well as 
studies comparing quality across subsidized and unsubsidized children.             
As previously stated, conditioning eligibility for child care subsidies on employment and 
income can be at odds with child development if lapses in eligibility lead to unstable child care 
arrangements.
25  Indeed, studies show that children participating in multiple arrangements have 
difficulties adjusting to new environments and developing trusting relationships with teachers and 
peers (Bacharach & Baumeister, 2003; Crockenberg & Litman, 1991; Youngblade, 2003).  Such 
concerns are heightened given that the median subsidy spell lasts only three to seven months (Meyers 
et al., 2002).  Furthermore, by increasing purchasing power, child care subsidies create incentives to 
buy more child care in the formal market.  If the quality of care purchased with subsidies is poor, 
then subsidies might lead to a situation in which subsidized children are exposed to risky 
environments for longer periods.       
Using the ECLS-K, we examine whether subsidized and unsubsidized children differ 
according to the intensity and stability of nonparental arrangements.   Results from this exercise are 
presented in Table 7.  The top panel of Table 7 provides an overview of child care use in the years 
prior to subsidy receipt.  Specifically, it shows the fraction of recipients and non-recipients beginning 
their first nonparental arrangement at a given age.  It appears that the patterns of early child care use 
                                                 
25 Recent work by Adams, Snyder, and Sandfort (2002) highlight many challenges faced by parents in retaining access to child care 
subsidies.  For example, states’ recertification process, which occurs at regular intervals (usually every six or 12 months), is a way for 
agencies to check employment and income eligibility status.  However, a failure to recertify can leave families ineligible for subsidies.  
Furthermore, states require parents to notify agencies if there is a change in employment status, including a job loss or a change in hours 
worked.  Some states offer a brief window of continued access to subsidies if parents lose their job (to facilitate a job search), but others 
move quickly to eliminate eligibility.        
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 are similar for both groups of children.  For example, about equal proportions of subsidized and 
unsubsidized children first participated in nonparental care before age one (46 percent versus 43 
percent).  A significantly greater fraction of recipients started care at age one, but the percentages are 
identical at each starting-age thereafter.   
The story changes dramatically, however, for child care use in the year of subsidy receipt 
(bottom panel of Table 7).  In particular, subsidized children participate in nonparental care more 
intensively than non-recipients.  Recipients are more likely to use a nonparental arrangement at least 
five times per week (82 percent versus 75 percent), and are more likely to be in care at least 40 hours 
per week (42 percent versus 35 percent).  In addition, we find evidence that subsidized children 
receive less stable child care: a significantly greater share of subsidy recipients participates in 
multiple arrangements (57 percent versus 41 percent).  Taken together, these data suggest that 
differential patterns of child care use emerge after children receive a subsidy.  Subsidy recipients 
participate in nonparental care child environments more intensively, but at the same time, these 
arrangements tend to be more unstable.  Of course, greater intensity of child care use cannot by itself 
explain the poorer outcomes among subsidized children; the impact of exposure depends crucially on 
the quality of care.  However, the ECLS-K data do not permit detailed comparisons of child care 
quality, so we turn to the literature to provide insights.   
Recent empirical work finds that average child care quality in the U.S. is rated “minimal” or 
“good” according to structural (e.g., child-to-staff ratio, group size, and conformity with health and 
safety standards) and process (e.g., caregiver interactions and cognitive/language stimulation) 
measures of child care environments (Helburn et al., 1995; Mocan, 1997; NICHD, 2000a).  Studies 
by the NICHD Early Child Care Research Network (2000a) estimate that 42 percent of preschool 
child care settings are “poor” or “fair” quality, and  that positive caregiving is “highly characteristic” 
for only 12 percent of children.  A review of child care settings by the National Research Council 
appears to corroborate this, finding that 10 percent to 20 percent of early care and education 
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 environments are “inadequate” and pose serious risks to child development (National Research 
Council & Institute of Medicine, 2000).    
  Although overall child care quality has been rated “good” at best, it is important for the 
purposes of this paper to discuss differences in purchased quality across low- and high-income 
families and subsidized and unsubsidized families.  Studies comparing child care use across income 
groups find inconsistent differences in the quality of center-based care, with some research pointing 
to higher quality among low-income children (NICHD, 1997; Phillips et al., 1994) and others finding 
lower quality (Loeb et al., 2004; Marshall et al., 2001).  Research by Dowsett et al. (2008) finds that 
structural measures of child care quality are about equal for low- and high-income children, but that 
poor children experience lower quality care across several process-oriented measures, including 
negative adult interactions and cognitive stimulation.  The quality of family-based and relative care, 
however, is more consistently of lower quality among low-income children (Coley et al., 2001; 
Dowsett et al., 2008; Votruba-Drzal et al., 2004).   
A sizeable body of research compares purchased child care quality across subsidized and 
unsubsidized (low-income) children.  Generally speaking, results from these studies imply that 
subsidized children receive lower-quality care (Adams et al., 2001; Jones-Branch et al., 2004; 
Mocan, 2007; Raikes, Raikes, & Wilcox, 2005; Queralt, Witte, & Greisinger, 2000; Thornburg et al., 
2002; Whitebook et al., 2004; Witt, Queralt, & Witte, 2000).  For example, recent work by Mocan 
(2007) finds that subsidy density within child care centers (or the fraction receiving subsidized care) 
is negatively associated with a number of quality indicators, such as the sensitivity of child-teacher 
interactions, the frequency and nature of parent-teacher interactions, availability of materials that 
facilitate imaginative and active play, and the level of daily supervision.  These findings are 
corroborated by state-specific analyses.  An examination of daycare centers in Nebraska, for 
example, finds that subsidy density is negatively correlated with overall quality, as well as teacher 
salary and measures of cognitive stimulation (Jones-Branch et al., 2004).  Many of these quality 
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 differences are pronounced for children attending family-based care.  A general finding in the 
literature is that subsidized providers are rated worse on both structural and process measures, 
especially caregiver education and sensitivity, staff turnover, and social interactions.  Other 
researchers find that subsidized providers are also more likely to be out of compliance with state 
licensing standards (Queralt, Witte, & Greisinger, 2000; Thornburg et al., 2002). 
In sum, this discussion suggests that child care subsidies shift children into a formal market 
providing “minimal” or “good” quality services, with (unsubsidized) low-income and subsidized 
children experiencing even poorer-quality environments.  These quality concerns cut across the range 
of formal child care options—including center-based care—but appear to be particularly applicable 
to family-based settings.  Results from this body of work, in combination with the descriptive 
evidence presented in Table 6, paint a tentative picture about the mechanisms through which the 
negative subsidy effects are operating.  Specifically, it is conceivable that subsidized children receive 
intense exposure to low-quality care through center- and family-based arrangements.  Furthermore, 
given that subsidized children are more likely to participate in multiple arrangements, these quality 
deficits might grow larger as the number of child care settings increases.  Our story for the role of 
child care quality is plausible in light our earlier finding that subsidized families are equally 
represented across most socioeconomic strata.          
VI.       Conclusions 
In recent years, child care subsidies have become an important policy instrument to help low- 
income parents move from welfare into the paid labor force.  Given that the current subsidy system 
strictly ties benefits to participation in work-related activities, parents are able to use subsidies to 
purchase child care services from any legally-operating provider.  However, there are few incentives 
or requirements within the CCDF that encourage parents and providers to make quality-enhancing 
investments.  As a consequence, there are reasons to be concerned about the implications of child 
care subsidies for the well-being of children.    
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 In this paper, we provide the first systematic assessment of the impact of the U.S. child care 
subsidy system on child development.   Using a sample of ECLS-K children living with single 
mothers, we find consistent evidence that subsidies are associated with negative child development 
outcomes.  In particular, our results suggest that subsidy receipt in the year before kindergarten 
lowers reading and math test scores, decreases the eagerness to learn, and leads to more behavior 
problems in the fall of kindergarten.  The negative subsidy effects for reading and math test scores 
persist to the spring of kindergarten, but many of the behavioral effects attenuate.  Although far from 
definitive, we provide evidence that the intense exposure to low-quality child care could be 
responsible for the negative subsidy effects.  This story seems plausible in light of the fact that 
subsidized families are no worse off economically than their unsubsidized counterparts.   
Our investigation points to the necessity of aligning the employment goals established by 
recent social policy reforms with the goal of ensuring child health and well-being.  One way to 
accomplish this is by decoupling the strong relationship between subsidy receipt and employment, or 
by giving parents and child care providers strong to incentives to make quality investments.  Based 
on the results of this study, policy changes directed at increasing the continuity of subsidized care 
would be beneficial, as would establishing reimbursements at a level high enough to allow parents to 
choose among high-quality providers in the community.  Furthermore, the recent experience with 
pre-kindergarten in the U.S. may provide additional guidance on how to integrate child development 
goals into the subsidy system. 
There are several possible directions for future research in this area.  First, it is critical that 
researchers understand the mechanisms through which child care subsidies influence child well-
being.  Although we put forth a plausible story about the role of child care quality, additional work 
needs to verify whether this is the case.  Future work should also attempt to understand the role of 
maternal employment, given that previous studies tend to find a negative relationship between early 
maternal work and child development.  Second, it is important to determine whether certain child 
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 care arrangements are responsible for the negative subsidy effects.  It is clear that subsidy recipients 
are more likely to participate in center- and family- based child care, making these arrangements a 
reasonable place to begin an investigation.  Finally, it is important to explore heterogeneity in the 
impact of child care subsidies.  Given that previous research on child care finds a differential 
response depending on child and family characteristics, one may assume that such heterogeneity 
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Table 1: Descriptive Results for the Child Development Outcomes, Fall and Spring of Kindergarten 
Variable Full  Sample  Subsidy  Recipient  Non-Recipient 
Cognitive Outcomes     
     Reading Test Score, Fall (N=2,795)  47.54  
(9.42) 








  48.10** 
(9.81) 












  48.33** 
(9.69) 
Behavioral Outcomes     










       -0.090* 
(9.804) 




     -0.139*** 
(9.966) 




     -0.015*** 
(10.090) 




  0.162* 
(9.974) 






     Self-Control, Fall (N=2,720)   0.005 
(10.069) 
            -1.556 
(10.096) 
        0.276*** 
(10.042) 
     Self-Control, Spring (N=2,554)  -0.167 
(10.073) 
           -2.009 
(9.691) 
      0.151*** 
(10.105) 




      0.251*** 
(9.921) 




           -1.737 
(9.773) 
      0.050*** 
(10.083) 
Physical and Psychomotor Outcomes     




       -0.108 
(9.937) 
     Gross Motor Skills, Fall (N=2,766)          -0.068 
(9.933) 




Source: Authors’ calculations from the ECLS-K Base Year Restricted Use Data File. 
Notes: All means are weighted using the ECLS-K Parent Full Sample weight.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Analyses are 
conducted on children with non-missing data.  The number of subsidy recipients is 410 for the cognitive and behavioral outcomes, 
approaches to learning, and fine motor skills; 398 for self-control; 402 for interpersonal skills; 406 for gross motor skills.   *, **, *** 
indicate that the difference in means for subsidy recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant at the 0.10 percent, 0.05 percent, 
and 0.01 percent levels, respectively.       Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Subsidy Receipt Status 
Variable Full  Sample  Subsidy  Recipient  Non-Recipient 
Child Characteristics      












      0.172*** 
(0.377) 




     0.234*** 
(0.423) 










     0.120*** 
(0.325) 

















   (0.500) 




    0.409** 
(0.492) 




    0.362** 
(0.481) 




















     0.050*** 
(0.218) 












































      0.307*** 
(0.461) 












      0.319*** 
(0.466) 
Family Characteristics      






      30.44*** 
(6.07) 






      0.426*** 
(0.495) 






      0.840*** 
(0.367) 




      0.183*** 
(0.386) 




    0.369** 
(0.483) 
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    0.339** 
(0.473) 




     0.109*** 
(0.312) 














      0.515*** 
(0.500) 














      0.118*** 
(0.323) 




      0.699*** 
(0.459) 






      0.412*** 
(0.492) 




      27,383*** 
(34,519) 






































      0.147*** 
(0.354) 














   0.302** 
(0.459) 






      0.458*** 
(0.498) 
Zip Code Characteristics      
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State-level Social Policy Environment      
























































     Federal/State EITC Max Credit                  







     Expenditures on State Pre-K Programs  








Source: Authors’ calculations from the ECLS-K Base Year Restricted Use Data File. 
Notes: All means are weighted using the ECLS-K Parent Full Sample weight.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Analyses are 
conducted on children with non-missing data.  *, **, *** indicate that the difference in means for subsidy recipients and non-recipients 




 Table 3: OLS Results for the Impact of Child Care Subsidies on Child Development, 
Fall of Kindergarten 
Child Outcome  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Reading Test Score  0.565  0.565  0.596 
 (0.505)  (0.509)  (0.510) 
Math Test Score  0.649  0.667  0.660 
 (0.477)  (0.480)  (0.477) 
Internalizing Problem Behavior        -0.494  -0.492          -0.489 
 (0.596)  (0.600)  (0.601) 
Externalizing Problem Behavior     1.193**     1.219**   1.154* 
 (0.594)  (0.591)  (0.590) 
Approaches to Learning   -0.139  -0.162          -0.025 
 (0.557)  (0.557)  (0.556) 
Self-control   -0.832  -0.996*  -1.006* 
 (0.581)  (0.579)  (0.582) 
Interpersonal Skills         -0.581        -0.619          -0.575 
 (0.588)  (0.591)  (0.593) 
Fine Motor Skills    0.976*   0.917*   0.981* 
 (0.551)  (0.549)  (0.548) 
Gross Motor Skills        -0.407        -0.390          -0.321 
 (0.565)  (0.563)  (0.570) 
State Policy Controls  No  Yes  Yes 
Zip Code-Level Controls  No  No  Yes 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ECLS-K Base Year Restricted Use Data File. 
Notes:  Each cell represents the coefficient on child care subsidy receipt derived from an OLS regression of each 
child outcome on the subsidy dummy, the full set of child and family controls presented in Table 2, and depending 
on the column, state policy controls and zip code-level controls.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   All 
models include dummy variables that equal unity for the child care and family controls with missing data.  Analyses 
are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight.  Full results are available from the authors 
upon request.  *, **, **** indicate that the subsidy coefficient is statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively.   
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 Table 4: 2-SLS Results for the Impact of Child Care Subsidies on Child Development,  
Fall of Kindergarten 
Child Outcome  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Reading Test Score  -2.827*  -3.109*  -2.916* 
 (1.511)  (1.591)  (1.629) 
Math Test Score        -2.236        -2.309  -2.454* 
 (1.382)  (1.425)  (1.446) 
Internalizing Problem Behavior  0.910  1.051  0.992 
 (1.727)  (1.749)  (1.819) 
Externalizing Problem Behavior  0.462  0.639  0.442 
 (1.744)  (1.791)  (1.887) 
Approaches to Learning      -3.723**    -4.224**  -3.240* 
 (1.580)  (1.650)  (1.726) 
Self-control  -0.919        -2.368  -3.055* 
 (1.742)  (1.808)  (1.880) 
Interpersonal Skills   -1.627        -2.055          -2.327 
 (1.679)  (1.752)  (1.816) 
Fine Motor Skills  0.227        -0.371  0.002 
 (1.613)  (1.669)  (1.723) 
Gross Motor Skills  -1.978        -1.954          -1.710 
 (1.666)  (1.722)  (1.813) 
State Policy Controls  No  Yes  Yes 
Zip code Level Controls  No  No  Yes 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ECLS-K Base Year Restricted Use Data File. 
Notes:  Each cell represents the coefficient on child care subsidy receipt derived from a 2-SLS regression of each 
child outcome on the subsidy dummy, the full set of child and family controls presented in Table 2, and depending 
on the column, state policy controls and zip code-level controls.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  All 
models include dummy variables that equal unity for the child care and family controls with missing data.  Analyses 
are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight.  Full results are available from the authors 
upon request.  *, **, **** indicate that the subsidy coefficient is statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 








Table 5: OLS and 2-SLS Results for the Impact of Child Care Subsidies on Child Development, 
Spring of Kindergarten 
 
 OLS  2-SLS 
Child Outcome  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Reading Test Score  0.248  -0.146   -3.222**         -1.612 
 (0.530)  (0.382)  (1.643)  (1.179) 
Math Test Score  0.034  -0.429     -4.212***     -2.871*** 
 (0.463)  (0.325)  (1.462)  (1.031) 
Internalizing Problem Behavior  0.149  0.389         -2.362         -1.475 
 (0.592)  (0.490)  (1.710)  (1.524) 
Externalizing Problem Behavior  0.818  0.306         -0.553  0.071 
 (0.599)  (0.440)  (1.760)  (1.279) 
Approaches to Learning   0.117  -0.036         -0.856         -0.058 
 (0.583)  (0.437)  (1.698)  (1.282) 
Self-control    -1.275**  -0.747  -2.993*         -1.894 
 (0.577)  (0.471)  (1.769)  (1.427) 
Interpersonal Skills          -0.755  -0.575         -0.625         -0.924 
 (0.581)  (0.486)  (1.753)  (1.437) 
Lagged Dependent Variable  No  Yes  No  Yes 
State Policy Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Zip code Level Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ECLS-K Base Year Restricted Use Data File. 
Notes:  Each cell represents the coefficient on child care subsidy receipt derived from a 2-SLS regression of each child outcome on the 
subsidy dummy and the full set of child and family controls presented in Table 2.  All models include dummy variables that equal unity for 
the child care and family controls with missing data.  Analyses are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight.  
Full results are available from the authors upon request.  *, **, **** indicate that the subsidy coefficient is statistically significant at 0.10, 
























 Table 6: Additional Results and Tests of Robustness 
  RTC MTC IPB EPB  ATL  SC  IS FMS  GMS 













   -2.327 
(1.816) 
    0.002 
(1.723) 
    -1.710 
(1.813) 
States with clear county 
administration of subsidies 
 
   -4.994*** 
(1.870) 
 












   -1.229 
(2.039) 
    -3.362 
(2.096) 
Add controls for states’ 
child care regulations 















   -0.464 
(1.783) 
     -2.241 
(1.922) 
Add controls for 



















    -1.814 
(1.820) 













    -3.013 
(1.881) 
   -2.330 
(1.806) 
   -0.061 
(1.723) 
    -1.543 
(1.798) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ECLS-K Base Year Restricted Use Data File. 
Notes:  Each cell represents the coefficient on child care subsidy receipt derived from a 2-SLS regression of each child outcome on the subsidy dummy and the full set of child and family controls 
presented in Table 2, including the state and zip code controls.  All models include dummy variables that equal unity for the child care and family controls with missing data.  These results are based on 
the fall of kindergarten child outcomes.  RTC: reading test score; MTC: math test score; IPB: internalizing problem behavior; EPB: externalizing problem behavior; ATL: approaches to learning; SC: 
self-control; IS: interpersonal skills; FMS: fine motor skills; GMS: gross motor skills.  The model for states with clear local subsidy administration excludes the following states: Arizona, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Iowa, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  The model including 
states’ child care regulations includes: center child-staff ratios for four-year-olds; family child-staff ratios for four-year-olds; center maximum group size for four-year-olds; family maximum group size 
for four-year-olds; a dummy variables that equals unity if center directors are required to have at least a BA degree; a dummy variables that equals unity if center/family child care staff are required to 
enroll in child development coursework; a dummy variables that equals unity if center/family staff are required to undergo a criminal background check; a dummy variables that equals unity if 
center/family indoor space is regulated by states; and a dummy variables that equals unity if states can impose a fine on center/family providers for failing to comply with regulations.  Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses.  Analyses are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight.  Full results are available from the authors upon request.  *, **, **** indicate that the 
subsidy coefficient is statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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 Table 7: Patterns of Non-Parental Child Care Use for Subsidy Recipients and Non-Recipients 
in the Years Prior to Kindergarten Entry 
Characteristic Full  Sample  Recipients Non-Recipients 
Child Care Use in the Years Prior to Subsidy Receipt  
Began First Nonparental Arrangement < Age 1  0.435  0.459  0.431 
Began First Nonparental Arrangement at Age 1  0.121  0.176       0.112*** 
Began First Nonparental Arrangement at Age 2  0.104  0.108  0.103 
Began First Nonparental Arrangement at Age 3  0.143  0.149  0.141 
Child Care Use in the Year of Subsidy Receipt 
Months in Child Care (%)       
          1-2 Months  0.027  0.025  0.028 
          3-5 Months  0.059  0.096             0.051*** 
          6-8 Months  0.126  0.140  0.124 
          9-12 Months  0.784  0.737      0.793** 
5+ Days/Week in Child Care (%)  0.764  0.823        0.751*** 
Hours/Week in Child Care       
          1-20 Hours  0.377  0.296             0.394*** 
          21-39 Hours  0.262  0.285  0.257 
          40+ Hours  0.360  0.417        0.347*** 
Multiple Child Care Arrangements (%)  0.433  0.567        0.408*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ECLS-K Base Year Restricted Use Data File. 
Notes: Analyses are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight.  Analyses are limited to children in non-
parental child care arrangements (relative, non-relative, center-based, school-based, and Head Start) in the years prior to kindergarten 
entry.  The percentages for children in multiple child care arrangements include children in Head Start.  Center-based arrangements 
include daycare services, while school-based arrangements include pre-k, preschool, and nursery school.  Non-relative care includes 
both in-home and out-of-home arrangements.  *, **, *** indicate that the percentages for subsidy recipients and non-recipients are 








































Alabama  ●   ●  ●  
Alaska  ●   ●  ●  ● 
Arizona     ●   ● 
Arkansas  ●   ●  ●  ● 
California  ●   ●  ●  
Colorado  ●  ●  ●    
Connecticut     ●  ●  
Delaware  ●   ●   ● 
Dist. of Col.           
Florida  ●  ●  ●  ●  
Georgia  ●   ●  ●  
Hawaii         ● 
Idaho  ●   ●    
Illinois  ●   ●    
Indiana  ●   ●   ● 
Iowa  ●        
Kansas  ●   ●    
Kentucky  ●   ●   ● 
Louisiana  ●        
Maine  ●   ●  ●  ● 
Maryland  ●   ●    
Massachusetts  ●   ●  ●  
Michigan  ●   ●    
Minnesota  ●   ●  ●  
Mississippi  ●     ●  
Missouri  ●   ●    
Montana  ●   ●    
Nebraska  ●   ●    
Nevada  ●   ●   ● 
New Hampshire           
New Jersey  ●        
New Mexico  ●   ●   ● 
New York  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
North Carolina  ●   ●  ●  
North Dakota  ●        
Ohio  ●   ●   ● 
Oklahoma  ●   ●    
Oregon  ●   ●    
Pennsylvania  ●   ●    
Rhode Island          ● 
South Carolina      ●  ●  
South Dakota      ●    
Tennessee  ●   ●  ●  ● 
Texas  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Utah  ●        
Vermont  ●        
Virginia  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Washington  ●   ●    
West Virginia  ●        
Wisconsin  ●   ●    
Wyoming  ●        
Notes: Data in this table come from the following: (1) Schulman, K., Blank, H., & Ewan, D. (2001). A fragile foundation: State child care 
assistance policies. Washington, DC: The Children’s Defense Fund and (2) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration 
for Children and Families, Child Care Bureau. (2002). Child care and development fund: Report of state plans FY2002-2003.  Most of these 
figures reflect state policies in 2000.  The data on county reimbursement rates reflect county-level variation and regional (which typically 




Appendix Table 2: Results from the First-Stage Child Care 
Subsidy Receipt Equation   
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error 
Child’s Age   -0.002  0.001 
Boy    0.008  0.013 
Black     0.039*  0.022 
Hispanic   0.034  0.025 
Asian             -0.026  0.059 
Other Race/Ethnicity      0.094**  0.037 
Weight       0.002***  0.001 
Premature Birth   0.032  0.020 
Low Birth Weight     -0.059**  0.030 
Disabled   0.017  0.019 
First-time Kindergartner            -0.017  0.033 
One Sibling   0.013  0.017 
Two or More Siblings      0.045**  0.019 
Mother’s Age   0.005  0.011 
(Mother’s Age)
2 -0.010  0.017 
Mother was Teen at First Birth   0.008  0.018 
Early Maternal Work        0.069***  0.020 
Mother’s Education: HS/GED        0.095***  0.021 
Mother’s Education: Some College       0.120***  0.023 
Mother’s Education: BA+        0.141***  0.034 
Father’s Education: HS/GED   0.024  0.020 
Father’s Education: Some College   0.001  0.025 
Father’s Education: BA+             -0.048  0.032 
WIC Participant        0.088***  0.018 
Food Stamp Recipient        0.121***  0.017 
ln(total family income)             -0.003  0.004 
Primary Home Language is English            -0.013  0.032 
Children’s Books in Home   0.000  0.000 
(Children’s Books in Home)
2   0.000  0.000 
Children’s Tapes/CDs in Home   0.000  0.001 
(Children’s Tapes/CDs in Home)
2 0.000 0.000 
Parent Expects Some College for Child    0.043*  0.026 
Parent Expects BA for Child   0.030  0.023 
Parent Expects Post-BA for Child   0.021  0.024 
Southern Residence             -0.100  0.330 
Constant 2.202  1.842 
Zip Code Controls  Yes 
State Policy Controls  Yes 
County Fixed Effects  Yes 





F-statistic (p-value)  24.33 (< 0.01) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ECLS-K Base Year Restricted Use Data File. 
Notes: Analyses are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight.  Also included in 
the model are dummy variables that equal unity for each variable with missing data.  Not shown here are the 
coefficients on the zip code, state policy, and county fixed effects, which are the identifying instruments.  *, 
**, **** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.   
 
 
 